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Abstract:  This article examines the development of and contestation over the standards for 
certified fair trade, with particular attention to the U.S. context. It charts fair trade’s rapid growth 
in the United States since the 1999 advent of formal certification, explores the controversies 
generated by the strategy of market mainstreaming in the sector, and focuses on five key issues 
that have generated particularly heated contention within the U.S. fair trade movement. It offers 
a theoretical framework based in the literatures on agrifood systems, social movements, and 
public-choice economics, for understanding the corporate response to alternative markets such as 
fair trade. The article suggests a typology of responses by social movement actors to this 
increased corporate participation, and assesses the relevance of the U.S. case for the future 
prospects of fair trade, both in other national contexts and as an international movement. 
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FAIR TRADE STANDARDS, CORPORATE PARTICIPATION, AND  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESPONSES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Daniel Jaffee 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 On October  28, 2008, Starbucks Coffee announced a new partnership with the U.S. fair 
trade certifier Transfair USA and the international certification body Fairtrade Labeling 
Organizations International (FLO).  As part of the arrangement, Starbucks promised to increase 
its purchases of fair trade certified coffee to 40 million pounds per year, roughly doubling its 
current purchases and making the roasting giant the world’s largest single buyer of fair trade 
coffee.  “This dramatic volume increase will have a far-reaching positive impact in coffee 
growing communities throughout the developing world,” boasted Transfair USA’s CEO Paul 
Rice.  “It will send kids to school, bring clean water to farming communities and enable 
struggling farmers to put food on the table … Starbucks Shared Planet initiative empowers 
consumers to make ethical decisions about the coffee they drink, and support the farmers that 
produce it.”  According to the announcement, the deal positions Transfair and FLO as “key 
partners in the Starbucks Shared Planet commitment to ethical sourcing"  (Transfair USA 
2008e).   As part of the deal, Starbucks, Transfair USA and FLO-Cert “plan to develop a single 
audit system for farms applying for both Fairtrade certification and Starbucks Coffee and Farmer 
Equity (C.A.F.E.) Practices verification” (Transfair USA and Starbucks Coffee 2009).   
The response to the announcement from participants in the fair trade movement was 
mixed.   Some fair trade activists expressed enthusiasm that after nine years of participation in 
the fair trade system, Starbucks had finally agreed to raise its fair trade purchases to over ten 
percent of its total supply, but other long-time participants were more skeptical.  Dean Cycon, 
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the owner of fair trade coffee roaster Dean’s Beans, responded that “fair trade is about 
transparency and accountability, but up to now Starbucks has not been either .... The C.A.F.E. 
standards are pretty mysterious, and … the company is notorious for massaging what really goes 
on under those standards” (Patriana 2008).  
 The Starbucks/Transfair USA/FLO “partnership” encapsulates both the successes and 
dilemmas facing the growing fair trade movement in the United States.  On one hand, growing 
consumer interest in fair trade products has drawn the attention and participation of large 
corporate agrifood firms, whose purchases have substantially increased the volume of fair trade 
sales, heightened the visibility of the movement, and augmented the financial benefits flowing to 
producers and waged laborers.  On the other hand, such close collaboration between a certifier 
and one of its corporate licensees—that is, between fair trade’s national regulatory body and the 
party it is charged with regulating—bolsters charges by some critics that the certifier has lost 
distance and independence from the large commercial firms that represent an increasing 
proportion of fair trade volumes (and certifier revenues), even while sourcing only a small 
proportion of their total supply at fair trade terms.  The prospect of increased integration between 
the independent, third-party fair trade standards and Starbucks’ own first-party C.A.F.E. 
Practices standards also raises other concerns, including the possibility of the weakening of the 
former.    
 What are the motivations of large corporate firms that choose to engage with standards-
based alternative market systems such as fair trade?  Corporate entry into the fair trade market 
has generated a considerable degree of debate and discord among the actors who worked to 
create this alternative market in the first place, and in many cases movement activists have 
explicitly opposed corporate involvement.  Yet what is the nature of these activist responses; 
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how specifically do movement advocates work to protect the integrity of the standards or to keep 
them from being watered down?  Can this be done while still broadening the impact of these 
efforts and reaching a mainstream consumer base?  This article addresses these and other related 
questions through a case study of the U.S. fair trade movement and market, focusing on the 
phenomenon of corporate involvement—not merely in the retailing of fair trade certified goods, 
but in the processes of negotiating, establishing, enforcing and reformulating the standards and 
certifications undergirding this initiative—as well as the responses by social movement actors to 
that increased involvement.   
 Many observers have examined the increasing corporatization of “alternative agrifood 
networks” such as fair trade and organic agriculture (e.g., Allen and Kovach 2000; Guthman 
2004a), and the risks and benefits of the strategies of market mainstreaming adopted by these 
movements.  Others have explored the responses in the realm of advertising and public relations 
by agribusiness, distribution and retailing firms to the challenges posed by the standards and 
third-party certifications that underlie these alternative market systems, responses which have 
often been categorized as “greenwashing” or “fairwashing.”  M. Fridell et al. (2008: 23) argue 
that such responses collectively represent a “corporate countermovement” against the regulatory 
impact of such agrifood schemes.  However, with a few exceptions focused on organics (e.g., 
DuPuis and Gillon 2009), there has been virtually no examination of how large commercial firms 
have affected the actual shaping of these standards and rules themselves, nor an exploration of 
the manner in which this process has unfolded in fair trade.  Likewise, limited attention has been 
paid to the ways that social movement actors have responded to these threats and challenges in 
attempting to retain or reassert the original transformative character of the fair trade system.                           
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 This article examines the development of and contestation over the standards for certified 
fair trade, with particular attention to the U.S. context.  It briefly charts fair trade’s rapid growth 
in the U.S. since the 1999 advent of formal certification, explores the controversies generated by 
the strategy of market mainstreaming in the sector, and focuses on five key issues that have 
generated particularly heated contention within the U.S. fair trade movement.  It offers a 
theoretical framework based in the literatures on agrifood systems, social movements, and 
public-choice economics, for understanding the corporate response to alternative markets such as 
fair trade.  Since their inception, fair trade standards have undergone numerous changes, which 
can be categorized into three related processes: the cooptation of  the most transformative or 
redistributive elements of the original movement initiatives, the at least partial regulatory capture 
of the institutions charged with applying the standards, and the dilution or weakening of those 
standards.  Cross-cutting all of these phenomena has been a progressive sidelining of the deeper 
and more comprehensive social justice critiques that had underlain the fair trade initiative from 
its inception. 
 
STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION IN ALTERNATIVE AGRIFOOD SYSTEMS 
 
 The dramatic changes wrought by economic globalization upon agrifood systems have 
been charted by a wide range of scholars, and among the recurring themes is the rise of standards 
and certifications as a new form of governance.   Busch and Bain (2004) chart the emergence of  
private food standards, particularly those created by retailing firms, that they assert now play a 
greater role than either states or supra-state bodies such as the WTO in reshaping our food 
systems.  This move from public to private standards reflects the retreat of the state from the 
regulation of capital generally, as part of a broader shift from Fordism to neoliberalism over the 
past three decades.  Concomitant with these shifts are fundamental changes in the nature of food 
 
Jaffee, “Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation...” 5 
commodity chains, including a move from what Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and colleagues (1994) 
term “producer-driven” chains controlled by large production firms, toward “retailer-driven” 
chains dominated by distributors and chain retail firms.     
 At the same time, there has also been a rise of standards located in non-governmental, civil 
society networks and initiatives.  Fair trade is perhaps the most prominent of these, having 
evolved its own international certification system.  Such independent standards—while they 
often were developed explicitly to counter the deleterious social and ecological effects of food 
system globalization—can also be viewed as an artifact of the neoliberal turn away from public 
regulation.  At the same time, however, other important standards regimes are still firmly located 
within a state framework (such as the 2001 USDA organic standards) or a supra-state rubric 
(e.g., the European Union standards for organic food).   Raynolds and Wilkinson, utilizing a 
typology developed by Gereffi et al. (2005), distinguish between “captive” chains, in which 
“producers are firmly controlled by processors and retailers often through contracts,” and 
“relational” commodity chains such as those in fair trade, in which transactions are based on trust 
and the sharing of power and information across a network (2007: 36).   
Yet even these state-based and independent NGO standards regimes—which ostensibly 
respond primarily to the interests of social movements, consumers, and small producers, rather 
than those of capital—remain susceptible to broader pressures.  Mutersbaugh (2005a: 2033-
2035) argues that all agrifood standards are currently undergoing a process of globalization, in 
which the content of national, sectoral, and even civil society standards is progressively being 
altered as they become “harmonized” with evolving transnational regulatory regimes, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) norms and WTO sub-agreements such as 
TRIPS (Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights).  Mutersbaugh provocatively describes this 
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trend as a “corporate social movement” against the restrictions to the freedom of capital posed by 
non-corporate standards.  In other words, even the “relational” chains that characterize these 
more progressive initiatives are in danger of becoming “captive” to prevailing market forces.   
 The predominant way in which compliance with agrifood standards is verified is through 
certification, and the claims underlying these certifications are typically translated to consumers 
in the form of product labels.  The nature of the certification systems underpinning standards can 
be conceptualized in various ways.   Renard (2005a: 419) asserts that the power of certification 
rests upon the ability to define particular qualities related to goods and specific practices (in 
production, trading, processing, etc.), and by extension, to define which products do not meet 
such definitions.  “These practices,” she writes, “constitute, in effect, mechanisms of market 
entry and exclusion, converting them into a source of power for those who control them.”  
DuPuis and Gillon (2009: 8) call attention to this “boundary-setting” process as a key element in 
establishing identity and credibility for alternative agrifood markets, and describe the conflicts 
that can arise when other actors challenge the legitimacy of those certification boundaries. 
Another theme in this literature is the contestation between civil society and the market 
over the specific content of standards and certification in alternative agrifood alternatives, 
although the bulk of the discussion has focused on organic standards.  Some authors have 
examined the increasing contestation over fair trade standards and governance as corporate 
actors have entered the sector, unleashing struggles with the pioneering social movement players 
(e.g., G. Fridell 2007; Jaffee 2007; Renard and Perezgrovas 2007).   A few writers have focused 
on the fair trade and organic systems in tandem to illustrate the larger shifts toward standards-
based regulation in the agrifood system generally (See Mutersbaugh 2005b; 2005a; Raynolds and 
Wilkinson 2007; Jaffee and Howard forthcoming).  
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Yet despite this burgeoning literature, there has been virtually no meaningful attention to 
the specific processes by which mainstream market actors have attempted variously (and often 
simultaneously) to join, beat, and ignore the fair trade alternative, and to defuse the threats it 
might represent to their conventional industry practices.  Analyzing these strategies deployed by 
the dominant market firms can yield valuable insights into the types of responses that social 
movements might find most effective.    
   
CO-OPTATION, CAPTURE, AND DILUTION    
 
How should one make sense of the choices made by these large commercial players, who 
in many cases opt to “join the game” in alternative agrifood markets—taking advantage of the 
profits offered by these niches and the integrity they represent to consumers—while often also 
working to neutralize the transformative power of the standards underpinning that integrity?   I 
have already explored one set of analytics from the literature on the political economy of 
agrifood systems, including the globalization/harmonization of standards and “boundary 
conflicts.”  Yet while quite useful, these frames do not offer a sufficiently strong lens with which 
to understand the specific practices that capital utilizes in its quest to render the standards less of 
a threat.  Here it is useful to turn to conceptual frameworks from other arenas, including social 
movement literature focused on co-optation, and the public choice literature on the economics of 
regulation that examines regulatory capture.  
 Cooptation.   The concept of cooptation was most extensively developed in the sociological 
literature on U.S. social movements.  While it originally referred principally to “the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as 
a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” (Selznick 1949), the term has more 
recently been expanded to refer to three related but distinct processes, each of which describes 
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the ways that states or government entities work to neutralize the power of movements for social 
change.   The first is a process by which states aim to divert the goals or demands of a social 
movement or group to serve different, less transformative agendas.  Second, movement activists 
may be coopted into “working from within” the state—or merely cooperating with state actors—
in order to achieve some portion of their original goals through officially sanctioned means 
(Gamson 1968; Gamson 1975).  The term has also been used in a third sense to refer to a process 
by which the state appropriates the language, slogans, tactics or strategies of a movement, 
thereby aiming to divert them toward less radical ends. 
However, using such theoretical frameworks in the context of this article raises a few 
important questions.  Is it appropriate to apply the concept of cooptation—which has been most 
fully elaborated in the context of U.S. social movements (particularly the civil rights movements 
of the 1950s and 1960s), whose efforts were focused on changing state policy and law—to the 
sphere of agrifood systems, and to the much newer context of consumption-based “movements” 
such as fair trade, aimed at achieving change through the marketplace, and especially to cases 
where regulation and policy-setting does not occur in the public sphere?  Can this theory 
meaningfully be used to analyze situations in which industry, not the state, aims to weaken social 
movement demands, or in which non-state bodies play the central regulatory function?    
Several observers have answered these questions in the affirmative.  Campbell (2001) 
examines the sustainable agriculture movement in California as a case study of political 
cooptation, emphasizing the tensions that movement leaders encountered “between conviction 
and credibility” in choosing whether or not to work with state officials in developing new 
programs and policies.  Social movement goals can also be embodied or codified in the form of 
standards, and these standards too are susceptible to cooptation.  Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 
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likewise view “the corporatization of the organic food movement [as] an example of cooptation” 
(2007: 135), although these authors emphasize market appropriation of the countercultural 
practices and symbols of that movement.  Unlike the U.S. organic sector, however, where since 
2001 the state has been the locus of standards formation, in fair trade the standards are 
formulated by a non-governmental entity, originally emerging from civil society, yet one also 
vulnerable to (and capable of generating) similar pressures. 
 Regulatory Capture.   The related concept of regulatory capture helps to shed additional 
light on these dynamics.  The concept originally emerged from public-choice economic theory 
and in particular the work of economist and Nobel laureate George Stigler (1971).  Capture 
occurs when actors with a vested interest in the outcome of regulatory decisions aim to influence 
the bodies charged with making those regulations, and when those bodies, rather than protecting 
the public interest, instead operate to the benefit of the commercial or special interests they are 
charged with regulating.  The distortion of the regulatory function of federal agencies under 
recent U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, provides abundant evidence of 
such capture.  More recent literature on capture has also placed emphasis on the role played by 
other interest groups—e.g., consumers and environmentalists—in working to affect regulatory 
agendas (Laffont and Tirole 1991).   
Goodman and Goodman, describing the development of organic standards in California 
and the response by agribusiness firms, conclude that “this regulatory capture has forced 
progressive, more politicised organic imaginaries to the margins” (2007:3).  However, while the 
state-regulated U.S. organic sector clearly fits the framework for studies of capture, does fair 
trade provide an equally appropriate application of these concepts?   Do the non-profit 
international certification bodies Transfair USA and Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
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International (FLO) qualify as regulatory “agencies”?  Increasingly, the literature on standards 
refers to the application of both civil society and industry-generated standards as a regulatory 
function (See for example Mutersbaugh 2005a; Renard 2005b; Renard 2006; Fridell 2007; 
Raynolds, Murray and Heller 2007).  As the rest of this article illustrates, independent 
certification and standards-setting bodies are no less susceptible than their state-based regulatory 
cousins to hijacking by a set of interests opposed to those they are charged with protecting. 
 Dilution.  In addition to cooptation and capture, there is a third analytical lens that can aid 
in understanding the trajectory followed by the fair trade sector: standards dilution.  Dilution is a 
by-product of regulatory capture which focuses attention on the ways that industry involvement 
weakens standards, aiming in many cases to lower the bar to entry, thus allowing the certification 
of actors and practices that would have previously been impermissible.       
Several observers of the political economy of fair trade have used the analytic of 
weakening or dilution.  Marie-Christine Renard discusses the risk of corporate entrants “diluting 
minimum social-justice standards” that underpin fair trade, as well as what she terms “Starbucks’ 
standards-dilution strategy” toward the fair trade system (2005a: 420, 425).   M. Fridell et al. 
assert that because Northern fair trade advocates have failed “to publicly criticize the underlying 
structure of capitalism” that generates the deep asymmetries in global trade, “fair trade becomes 
more vulnerable to brand dilution” by the new corporate entrants (2008: 30).   
 Such strategies of standards weakening or bar-lowering, it must be noted, set up an 
important contradiction: permitting the entry of low-road competitors (who would previously 
have been excluded) clearly threatens to reduce the potential rent or price premium to be gained 
from the niche, not to mention consumer confidence in the initiative (Guthman 2004a; 2004b; 
Mutersbaugh 2005a).  I now proceed to examine in greater detail the way these processes of 
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movement co-optation, standards dilution, and regulatory capture have played out in the U.S. fair 
trade sector.   
Contestation Over Fair Trade Standards in the U.S.  
 This section discusses several key areas of contestation within the U.S. fair trade movement 
coalition, focusing on how each of these issues intersects with the processes outlined above.   
Many accounts describe the fair trade system in the United States as a largely successful story of 
the use of standards and certification to dramatically expand an alternative or ethical market, 
reaching a mainstream consumer base through mass-market retail channels, and redistributing 
capital to disadvantaged Southern producers through minimum prices.  Others, however, read the 
story of fair trade in the U.S. as a cautionary tale, involving the capture of an alternative market 
by large corporate firms who succeed in weakening its standards, and the diminution of the 
movement’s transformative power.  Both versions of the story, I argue, contain substantial 
elements of truth. 
 Much like its predecessors in Europe, the U.S. fair trade movement initially was 
characterized exclusively by the Alternative Trade Organization (ATO) model, in which goods 
from producer cooperatives are sold through non-profit organizations or ethical for-profit 
businesses (Raynolds and Wilkinson 2007: 36).   Church-based networks of craft sales, led by 
the Mennonite-affiliated Ten Thousand Villages, and later SERRV, linked with the Church of 
the Brethren, developed between the 1940s and 1970s to generate markets for the products of 
impoverished U.S. communities, and displaced and refugee groups abroad.  Boston-based Equal 
Exchange coffee, founded in 1986, pioneered the fair trade model for agricultural products in the 
U.S., filling this niche virtually alone for a decade.  Equal Exchange initially circumvented the 
U.S. commercial embargo against Nicaraguan coffee, finding a market among progressive 
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consumers through retail grocery cooperatives, and expanded to work with coffee farmer 
cooperatives in many other coffee-growing nations.   The young U.S. fair trade movement thus 
shared with its European counterparts a twin set of roots: one in religious development charities 
and another in solidarity activism on the political Left. 
 While the structures undergirding fair trade certification had developed in many European 
countries by the early 1990s, formal fair trade certification in the U.S. began only in 1997 with 
the creation of Transfair USA.   Transfair was initially housed in the Minneapolis-based NGO 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, but in 1999 it moved to Oakland, California and 
became an independent non-profit entity.  The U.S. movement quickly began to encounter the 
dilemmas and tensions associated with growth: was it possible to reach mass consumer 
audiences (as opposed to the more politically active “conscious consumers”) with fairly-traded 
goods while still hewing closely to the core values of fair trade, which emphasize building direct, 
long-term trading relationships and alternative trading structures?  While many of the national 
fair trade initiatives in Europe emerged out of development activism and NGO circles, since its 
1999 move Transfair USA has been characterized by a business-centered model, and civil 
society links have played a minimal role in its institutional culture and governance structure.   
The corporatization of fair trade arguably began in 2000, perhaps ironically as the result 
of an activist campaign targeting the multi-billion-dollar specialty coffee giant Starbucks, which 
had been targeted by international labor rights groups for its global labor and pricing practices.  
The San Francisco-based Global Exchange and a coalition of other NGOs insisted that Starbucks 
purchase and offer fair trade certified coffee, viewing it as a mechanism to leverage greater 
corporate accountability.  Shortly before they were to launch simultaneous protests in a number 
of cities, the company relented and agreed to sell fair trade coffee in all of its (then 2,300) U.S. 
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stores.  Since this development, several other large coffee firms have entered the fair trade 
market, among them specialty roasters such as Green Mountain Coffee and mass market coffee 
giants including Procter & Gamble.  While some of these firms were pushed into the market by 
activist campaigns, others were pulled by the lucrative potential of this growing niche market 
and/or active recruitment of mainstream firms by Transfair USA, as well as the very flexible 
conditions of entry. 
This mainstreaming strategy has proven quite effective at raising consumer demand for 
fair trade: the U.S. fair trade market experienced annual volume growth of at least 35 percent in 
every year except 2007 and is now the largest national fair trade market, exceeding $1 billion in 
sales in 2007  (FLO 2008; Transfair USA 2008d; Transfair USA 2009).  As of the end of 2008, 
260 producer organizations sold fair trade certified goods to the U.S. market, collectively 
receiving over $10.8 million in social premium payments and $34.6 million above the 
conventional market price, according to Transfair USA (2009).  Although the certifier announced 
in 2008 that it plans to dramatically expand its range of offerings to dozens of new products, 
primarily fresh and dried fruit, nuts and spices (Transfair USA 2008b), coffee still accounts for 
the large majority of the U.S. fair trade market, with over 87 million pounds imported in 2008 
from 152 producer organizations.  Of the 779 companies licensed by Transfair to import fair 
trade certified goods, 512 are coffee roasters and/or importers (Transfair USA 2009).  A 
substantial portion of the growth between 2007 and 2008 was due to increased purchases by 
large transnational firms, primarily Starbucks (which went from 11 million to 20 million pounds, 
roughly six percent of its total volume).   
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Key Debates in the U.S. Fair Trade Context 
  There has been a vigorous ongoing debate within the U.S. fair trade movement regarding 
the benefits and drawbacks of the system’s mainstreaming or corporatization.  However, what 
many participants may not have anticipated at the movement’s inception in the U.S. was how the 
large agrifood corporations entering the fair trade market would use their market power to push 
for changes in the actual “rules of the game” in order to reduce or eliminate the challenge posed 
by the standards to their existing pricing, labor and commercial practices.  In their discussion of 
the rise of non-state regulation, Raynolds et al. distinguish between standards that “raise the bar,” 
leading to improvements in social and environmental conditions, and those that “hold the bar,” 
merely preventing further degradation (2007: 148, 150).  While they include fair trade standards 
in the former group, the current context of fair trade in the U.S. can be described as one in which 
there is considerable pressure from the new corporate participants to (once again) lower the 
(raised) bar. 
 These pressures have played out in at least five key areas, which I will proceed to examine 
in greater detail: 1) the distinction between “movement-oriented” and “market-oriented” fair 
trade retailers; 2) the relationship of Transfair USA to these two groups of licensees, including 
the question of minimum entry requirements for licensing; 3) the level of fair trade minimum 
prices; 4) the increasing certification of plantation agriculture;  and 5) issues of fairness along the 
supply chain, as well as how best to manage market growth.  While only some of these issues are 
unique to the U.S., the struggles have played out in a distinctive form within the U.S. context, 
and some of the results have been determinative for the global fair trade movement and market 
as a whole. 
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1. Market-oriented versus Movement-oriented Retailers. 
 The fair trade movement was pioneered by small, ideologically-driven ATOs and 
cooperative businesses, selling entirely or largely fair trade products and with histories of long-
term involvement with producer groups and communities.  However, fair trade has increasingly 
drawn the participation of larger mainstream retailers, including some of the largest agrifood 
corporations.  Whether pulled in by the potential for profit in the increasingly lucrative fair trade 
niche or pushed by grassroots activists seeking to leverage fair trade as a corporate accountability 
tool, this new group of “market-oriented” retailers comes to the table with a very distinct set of 
motivations, and a different level of market power, than the “movement-oriented” companies.   
Several academic observers have discussed this distinction and its implications for the 
movement’s development (e.g., Tucker 2006; Fridell 2007; Fridell et al. 2008; Reed 2009) .  
Raynolds (2009) describes three groups: in addition to “mission-driven” and “market-driven,” 
she also identifies a “quality-driven” group of retailers that selectively engage with fair trade 
primarily to access supplies of high-quality products.   In addition to corporate roaster-retailers 
such as Starbucks, fair trade certified products are increasingly sold by large retail chains such as 
Wal-Mart and Costco under their store brands, and by large restaurant chains, including 
McDonalds and Dunkin Donuts.2  
 Over the past nine years, the difference between these two groups of retailers has become 
the most significant issue confronting the U.S. fair trade movement.  The question of the 
desirability of allowing large corporate firms to participate in this alternative market has 
increasingly riven the movement.  Many social movement activists view the development as a 
threat to the guiding principles of fair trade.  “We cannot let our radical vision of a completely 
 
2 Some observers (e.g., Reed 2009) argue that the sales of fair trade products through mainstream corporate retailers 
(e.g. Wal-Mart or McDonalds) is a distinct issue from—and less contentious within the movement than—the direct 
licensing of corporate roaster-retailers or processors such as Starbucks or Procter & Gamble. 
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different way of doing business be watered down by opportunistic transnationals,” writes Albert 
Tucker. “The fair trade mark should be regarded as a ‘badge of honor,’ not just a brand of food 
that demonstrates you are paying a little more to desperate farmers… if any transnationals are 
involved, they must negotiate with poor farmer businesses on an equal basis, having signed up to 
stringent standards across their entire operations” (Tucker 2006: 9).  Yet some other pioneering 
fair trade activists take a different stance; Pauline Tiffen, the founder of Cafédirect and Divine 
Chocolate, argues that “for better or worse, as soon as Dunkin’ Donuts has fair trade espresso, it 
does open doors.  It’s a mistake to discount the impact of things just because you don’t agree 
with the motives of the people doing it” (quoted in Tucker 2006). 
2)  Transfair USA’s Relationship to Market  and  Movement Participants.  
 While highly contentious, the entry of corporate licensees into the fair trade system has 
indisputably increased the volume, variety and visibility of fair trade certified products in the 
marketplace.  A substantial part of the dramatic growth in fair trade sales in the U.S. can be 
attributed to increased purchasing by corporate licensees.  However, some fair trade participants 
argue that the growth imperative has facilitated cooptation, as the regulatory function of FLO 
and the NI’s clashes with an economic interest in increasing demand.   They often point to the 
groundbreaking certification deal between Transfair USA and Starbucks as emblematic of these 
contradictions.   
 The first significant instance of cooptation and dilution in the U.S. fair trade setting was the 
decision to lower the bar for entry into the certification system.  In Transfair USA’s initial two 
years, there was negotiation over the minimum participation level that would be required to enter 
fair trade.  The directors of Equal Exchange recommended to Transfair that in order for a 
company to place the fair trade seal on any of its products, at least five percent of its total 
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purchases must be made at fair trade terms from cooperatives on the international fair trade 
register.  “Our thinking,” writes Equal Exchange’s Rodney North,  
was that this would help ensure long term commitments, and not merely token 
participation….We suggested a staggered formula, that recognizes the real-world, 
operational constraints faced by large businesses.  Therefore we proposed that the bigger a 
business, the lower the initial Fair Trade percentage they would have to commit to in order 
to use the seal.  On this scale 5 percent was the lowest hurdle…and we believe that we got 
a commitment from Transfair to require the 5 percent.  However, what happened in 
practice seems to be that Transfair simply encourages companies to work toward 5 percent.  
Further, we also encouraged that the bar be raised steadily over time… of course since we 
didn’t get the 5 percent, we didn’t get the ‘bar raising’ requirement either (quoted in Green 
LA Girl 2006).   
 
Transfair’s position became clear when it brought Starbucks to the negotiating table: the coffee 
giant entered the FLO/Transfair system in 2000 with approximately one percent of its purchases 
at fair trade terms.   
 Since 2000, some of the mass-market coffee transnationals (among them Procter & Gamble 
and Sara Lee in the U.S.) have also struck deals to enter the system while purchasing very small 
amounts of coffee—less than one percent of their total volume—at fair trade terms. Transfair 
USA still does not stipulate any particular purchase level to qualify for use of the seal, nor is 
there a requirement for increases over time; these details are negotiated in private deals with 
individual firms.  The certifier’s website makes its position on this issue clear: “[p]articularly for 
large companies, it is unrealistic to expect them to convert large portions of their overall business 
to Fair Trade overnight, before demand has been proven … If we take a rigid approach with 
regard to minimum volumes or percentages—presumably in defense of the credibility of the 
label—we could potentially lose significant volume to the detriment of the farmers we seek to 
serve” (Transfair USA 2008c).  Yet without a requirement for firm minimum (and rising) 
purchasing levels, fair trade risks being used by corporations to engage in “fair-washing,” 
reaping substantial image benefits while engaging with fair trade at merely token levels.  “By 
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opening its social claims to mainstream retailers while simultaneously pushing for large volume 
sales,” write Holt-Giménez et al. (2007: 15), “Fairtrade has left itself open to a public relations 
coup by corporate free riders.”  These firms clearly see fair trade as a profitable niche and a 
useful corporate social responsibility tactic, but the critics argue that the certifier has a 
responsibility to force corporations to go beyond this niche, instead using fair trade as 
mechanism to leverage greater corporate accountability.  Moreover, charge the movement-
oriented retailers, the large firms who dabble in fair trade at token levels are able to subsidize the 
additional costs of their fair trade purchases with profits from their conventional sales, thus 
undercutting the retail prices of the 100-percent fair trade firms, who are not able to externalize 
their social costs in a similar fashion (Reed 2009: 12).        
 The global fair trade certifier FLO has been the locus of struggles over both the relative 
power of movement and market forces, and of Northern versus Southern interests, within the 
international fair trade system (Renard and Perezgrovas 2007: 149).  To a degree, these same 
concerns have been directed at Transfair USA as well.  Because licensing fees follow volumes, 
the large firms make an increasingly substantial financial contribution to Transfair.  Licensing 
fees accounted for 64.7 percent of Transfair’s revenues in 2007, the last year for which data are 
available (Transfair USA 2008f).  The fees paid by Starbucks alone in 2008 for its 20 million 
pounds of fair trade coffee (approximately six percent of the coffee it roasted under its own 
brand name3) thus account for approximately 17 percent of the certifier’s operating budget.  This 
poses a dilemma: while an alternative to volume-based payments would be difficult to identify, 
they do create a structural dependency upon these large firms, as well as a disincentive to take 
policy decisions that might alienate a large licensee.  Identification by regulators with the 
interests of the regulated party is a key element of capture.   The recent announcements by 
 
3 Starbucks also purchases and roasts coffee for other firms (such as Costco’s Kirkland store brand). 
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Transfair of its certification “partnership” with Starbucks blurs the lines between regulator and 
regulated even further, and raises questions about the certifier’s ability to remain independent 
and rigorous. 
 Another question concerns the representation of different constituencies on the decision-
making body or bodies.  After substantial lobbying by fair trade producers, FLO recently made 
changes to its organizational structure that give greater voting power to Southern producer 
groups, although they still constitute a minority of the board and committees.  At Transfair USA, 
on the other hand, there have been no major governance reforms.  According to Reed (2009: 21), 
"key constituencies, such as ATOs and advocacy groups, feel that they are not (adequately) 
represented on the boards of the [national certfication initiatives or NI's]. In this context, some 
[NI's], perhaps most notably TransFair USA, have come under sharp criticism for not upholding 
a commitment to fair trade values and practices and for not listening to the concerns of actors in 
the fair trade movement."  A look at the composition of the initiative’s board of directors 
(Transfair USA 2008a) indicates that five of the 12 board members come from the corporate or 
finance sector (including the former CEOs of Archer Daniels Midland Cocoa and Ocean Spray 
Cranberries), three come from the non-profit sector (from large NGOs and foundations), two are 
consultants (one with an academic affiliation) and one is the CEO of Transfair USA.  The sole 
“producer” on the board is the general manager of a large coffee cooperative federation in Costa 
Rica.  Among the significant sectors of the fair trade movement that are not represented on the 
Transfair board are fair trade NGOs or civil society groups (e.g. Global Exchange), membership-
based fair trade groups (e.g., United Students for Fair Trade or the Fair Trade Federation), faith-
oriented groups with substantial fair trade programs (e.g. Catholic Relief Services or Lutheran 
 
Jaffee, “Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation...” 20 
World Relief), small and medium-sized fair trade retailers, or producers who were 
democratically elected to represent fair trade farmer interests. 
 After receiving withering criticism in 2005 from fair trade activists and small producer 
organizations for excluding them from negotiations over a certification deal with U.S.-based 
banana giant Chiquita (see below), Transfair agreed to engage in a dialogue with an ad hoc group 
of social movement NGOs about its relationship with corporations.   Emerging from these 
consultations was a set of guidelines, which address obliquely the issue of minimum volumes, 
and indicate the certifier’s preference for a voluntary, negotiated approach with its corporate 
licensees:   
Transfair encourages companies to make a strong investment in the success of their Fair 
Trade product offerings…to avoid the perception of ‘greenwashing,’ companies should 
seek media coverage that is commensurate with their actual volume and involvement with 
Fair Trade Certified products.  If a company appears to be using PR or advertising …to 
inflate its public image in a way that is disproportionate to its actual investment in Fair 
Trade, Transfair will engage the company in question to seek greater balance between word 
and action” (Transfair USA 2008g).   
  
This approach is in stark contrast to the position of the movement-oriented retailers.   Equal 
Exchange’s Rodney North argues that “even a tiny bit of fair trade can go a long way to 
polishing even the worst corporate image, and all at the expense of real reform… the same rules 
that allow Nestlé to put on a fair trade fig leaf in the U.K. market, apply in the U.S. as well.  And 
that’s why we at Equal Exchange are speaking out,  because we see this as the latest in a long 
line of actions by the world’s largest food businesses that look good in isolation, but ultimately 
forestall real change for impoverished farmers” (North 2008). 
3) Minimum Prices.    
 While fair trade prices and social premiums are set at the international level by FLO, the 
level of the minimum prices—primarily for coffee—has become a major point of contention 
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within the U.S. movement, in particular between the small movement-oriented roasters and the 
large firms.  For coffee in particular, the minimum prices had been raised only minimally since 
they were established in 1989, steadily losing purchasing power to inflation.  As the global 
coffee crisis receded in 2005 and 2006, movement-oriented firms increasingly found that many 
of the coffee farmers they worked with could not break even—let alone come out in the black—
with the FLO minimum prices, because their costs had risen while the base price stagnated.  
Rather than bringing these small farmers out of poverty, fair trade was further impoverishing 
them.  These small roasters—along with several producer associations—began to lobby for an 
increase in the FLO minimum prices. 
 A study by Bacon et al. (2006) documents that real fair trade coffee prices (adjusted for 
inflation) fell by 39 percent between 1988 and 2005.4  The minimum prices are important 
because they represent the sole way in which fair trade redresses the unjust distribution of returns 
along the commodity chain.   To the extent that minimum prices do not keep pace with increases 
in producer costs, the initiative is actually shifting capital further away from producers toward 
the retail end of the chain.  “Fairtrade’s efficacy as a safety net [for producers],” argue Holt-
Giménez et al., “is eroding because it is based on a premium price that no longer provides a 
living wage” (2007: 19).   
 The base prices for fair trade products (at first only coffee) were initially established by 
movement NGOs in the late 1980s based on assessments of producers’ costs and livelihood 
needs.   Individual buyers may pay higher than the FLO minimums if they choose.  The setting 
of prices became the purview of FLO after its creation in 1997.  Prices are thus an integral part of 
FLO standards, one of the most important.  A “fair price” was the raison d’etre for fair trade’s 
 
4 This calculation used only the U.S. Consumer Price Index; the loss of purchasing power in most producer countries 
has been greater.  
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creation, and it is arguably upon the premise of a fairer price that the moral power of the system 
continues to rest.    
 However, these prices must be understood as political.  Fair trade’s impact rests in large 
part upon its redistributive potential—the extent to which it shifts capital from retailers and 
distributors “upstream” along the commodity chain to cooperatives, producers, and in some cases 
waged laborers.5  Since the movement’s inception, however, the minimum price levels have 
come to reflect not a calculation of what small farmers need to sustain family livelihoods, but 
rather the prevailing balance of power between different groups of participants in the coalition: 
producers, certifiers, distributors, and retailers both small and large.    
 After substantial grassroots mobilization by producer groups, FLO agreed to a minor 
increase in the coffee base prices in 2007; they were raised to $1.35 per pound for conventional 
coffee and to $1.55 for certified organic (Transfair USA 2007).  However, as of this writing, the 
minimum price would need to rise to over $2.29 per pound to recoup its original purchasing 
power (Bacon 2009).  
 The concerns over the base prices have emerged within the U.S. as movement-oriented 
roasters pushed for a raise, and then responded to the small 2008 boost.  Just Coffee, for 
example, argued that the rise in the FLO social and organic premiums was good but inadequate: 
“however, the base minimum price is still $1.21 [now $1.25] for  fair trade coffee.  The idea with 
the ‘premium’ is that it should be ‘extra’ cash left over after producers are paid for the value of 
their coffee and labor, to be invested in community infrastructure…in order for these ‘premiums’ 
to work, we have to assume that growers are making money beyond the cash they need for basic 
survival.  We have heard from farmers that this is not always the case” (Just Coffee 2007).   In 
 
5 Of course, it is not merely the existence of price premiums per se, but the level of prices multiplied by actual sales 
volumes, that determines the extent of the redistributive impact.  
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response, the Cooperative Coffees roasters and the larger Equal Exchange have all chosen to 
establish their own, higher, minimum prices for coffee, as much as $2.20 per pound in the case 
of Just Coffee.  The roaster advocates that the review of FLO minimum prices should “be 
repeated often, with transparency and democratic participation from diverse stakeholders” (Just 
Coffee 2007). 
4)  Certification of Plantations.    
 Another point of contention concerns the increasing certification of plantation agriculture 
in the fair trade system.   Fair trade was originally designed as a system explicitly for the benefit 
of small farmers; in the global South, this meant marginalized peasant producers of tropical 
export commodities.  As fair trade expanded beyond coffee, certifiers occasionally turned to 
small, progressive estates or plantations to fill the gap.  They created a second “modality” in fair 
trade for waged workers, in which certification is based on minimum labor and safety conditions, 
allowing workers the right to unionize, payment of national minimum wages, and the payment of 
price premiums into an independent fund for the benefit of workers, to be managed by an 
organization jointly run by workers and owners.  While the hired labor modality was initially 
seen as a minor adjunct to small producers, the number and volume of certified products from 
plantations and estates has skyrocketed in the past few years, as FLO and the NI’s have 
attempted to meet retailers’ demands for a greater variety of fair trade products, such as fresh 
produce and flowers, many of which are sold under “own brand” labels at major retail chains 
(Barrientos et al. 2007).  This has raised concern among some activists and the movement-
oriented companies, because inclusion of plantation agriculture is seen as key to expanding the 
role of large corporate agrifood firms in the system.  While standards for plantation agriculture 
are set by FLO, the activities of the NI’s largely determine the size of this mode because of their 
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licensing function.  Transfair USA has played an active role in expanding plantation fair trade, 
by actively working to bring firms into the system.  These developments raise several key 
questions:  Is fair trade primarily a system for and about small producers?   What should be the 
role of the “plantation modality” within the larger fair trade movement?   Is fair trade the most 
appropriate mechanism for holding plantation owners accountable, and for achieving social 
justice for waged agricultural workers? 
 Among the criticisms directed at plantation certification is that it opens the door to the most 
socially and environmentally problematic forms of conventional agriculture, and can give the fair 
trade imprimatur to corporate “bad actors” with deeply problematic histories of labor rights 
violations.  In seeking a source of bananas for the U.S. market, for example, Transfair USA 
overtly sidelined social movement participants in order to negotiate directly with number-two 
banana giant Chiquita (and the international banana union COLSIBA) to certify a corporately-
owned plantation in Honduras, a deal that was ultimately unsuccessful (Raynolds 2007).   In 
2009, Dole—the world’s largest fresh fruit producer and trader, with far fewer unionized 
workers than Chiquita—did receive Transfair certification for bananas and pineapples produced 
on its Ecuadoran plantations (The Packer 2009).   
 Organizations of small producers have strenuously opposed the extension of fair trade 
certification to plantations.  One of the concerns they voice is that their cooperatives will be 
undercut by the high volumes and economies of scale involved in plantation production, and thus 
lose their markets.  Carmen Iezzi, director of the U.S.-based Fair Trade Federation, charges that 
“the large companies want to continue working with mass producers like plantations rather than 
going the tougher route, which is identifying small farmers and buying from them” (quoted in 
Goigoi 2008a).  Other critics add concerns that the benefits to workers are nebulous: national 
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minimum wages are a notoriously inadequate benchmark, the “independent” worker-
management organizations have an uneven track record at best; and there is no requirement of 
unionization (only the right to unionize), leaving the door open for labor rights violations.  
Indeed, in Colombia—a nation notoriously dangerous for unionists—none of the fair trade 
certified cut flower plantations is unionized (Goigoi 2008a).  This opposition from small 
producers has met with some limited success: there has been an agreement with FLO to keep 
four commodities free of plantation certification for the present: coffee, cocoa, honey, and cotton 
(Renard 2006: 7).  However, Transfair USA continues to rapidly expand the number of new fair 
trade products produced exclusively by the plantation sector (Transfair USA 2008b), shifting the 
profile of fair trade steadily toward large-scale conventional agriculture.   The certifier claims 
this move fulfills its social justice mission no less than buying from cooperatives: “The 
disadvantaged majority would be locked out of the market if I were to look for only small farms 
for bananas and tea,” claimed CEO Paul Rice (quoted in Goigoi 2008a).    
 Yet some critics respond that emphasizing the plantation sector is antithetical to the 
founding principles of fair trade.  After a recent article in the Times of London claimed that 
workers on Indian fair trade-certified tea estates were not reaping any economic benefits from 
the certification (Bahra 2009), Equal Exchange responded that “the findings presented in this 
article only serve to reaffirm our belief that plantations do not belong in the Fair Trade system in 
the first place… the company believes that ‘Fair Trade’ needs to mean ‘Small Farmer” and 
that… a joint labor-management council and social premiums cannot in and of themselves 
correct the huge imbalance of power that exist on a plantation”  (Equal Exchange 2009).  As the 
number and volume of plantation-sourced fair trade products increases, the contention between 
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these two distinct visions of fair trade within the U.S. movement is likely to become more 
pronounced. 
5)  Fairness Along the Supply Chain; Managing the Growth of Fair Trade.  
 A related issue is the question of what portion of the commodity supply chain ought to be 
the concern of fair trade standards.  The decision to certify Starbucks coffee was particularly 
galling to some activist groups because the company had long been the target of allegations of 
labor rights abuses—not only on the Central American plantations from which it purchased, but 
also at its cafés in the United States.  Two rulings by the U.S. National Labor Relations Board 
found that Starbucks had violated the rights of baristas at its cafes by interfering with union 
organizing activity (Workers Independent News 2005).   The sales of fair trade products by large 
corporate retailers, while initially somewhat less controversial than directly licensing 
transnational companies like Starbucks, have also recently become a major point of contention as 
well.  After Wal-Mart introduced three house-brand lines of fair trade certified coffee, labor 
activists charged that the retailer was engaging in a “fair-washing” strategy. “If Wal-Mart wants 
to ensure that producers of coffee are paid a living wage,” said David Nassar, executive director 
of the union-funded group Wal-Mart Watch,  “it should show the same concern for people who 
produce the 139,000 other products that they sell at the store” (quoted in Goigoi 2008b).  
Transfair USA, however, insists that these questions do not fall under its purview.   According to 
the certifier’s Corporate Engagement Guidelines, “Transfair’s certification and audit system 
focuses on Fair Trade Certified products, not a company’s overall business practices…it is 
beyond the scope of Transfair’s certification model to try to address these concerns.”  (Transfair 
USA 2008g). 
 
Jaffee, “Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation...” 27 
 A final issue, which underlies most of the others discussed above, is the question of fair 
trade’s growth.  What type of growth should the movement pursue, and at what cost?   There is a 
distinction between growth as a means to achieve ethical or moral goals (for example, greater 
economic justice) or further specific values, versus growth as an end in itself.  Even if the goals 
are clear, however, there is the question of which strategies will best achieve them.  In the case 
of fair trade, the movement-oriented activists and retailers argue for growth with a high bar: strict 
regulation of corporate participants with an obligation to increase volume percentages over time 
to work toward a “fully fair” supply.   Transfair USA, however, has opted to pursue a different 
model of social change, involving flexibility, negotiation, and collaboration with corporate 
licensees—maintaining a lower bar in the pursuit of volume growth as a primary goal.  Faced 
with this reality, some argue that movement-oriented players need to remain focused on their 
own distinct vision of growth.  “To keep Fairtrade from becoming irrelevant to farmers’ 
livelihood struggles,” write Holt-Giménez et al., “it is up to the ATOs, enlightened roaster-
retailers, students, activists, and progressive certifiers to help poor coffee farmers grow not just 
their market, but their market power; not just their businesses, but their controlling share within 
the business”  (Holt-Gimenez et al. 2007). 
 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESPONSES: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE 
 
As the previous sections indicate, co-optation is not necessarily a linear or uncontested 
process.  Typically, such actions engender various forms of resistance. Several of the recent 
developments within the fair trade system discussed above demonstrate how social movement 
constituencies have attempted to “push back” against cooptation and dilution of the initiative, 
and in some cases have managed to transform setbacks on standards into more ambiguous and 
ongoing processes of negotiation, and occasionally small victories.     
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A simple typology may aid in analyzing the responses to cooptation that have emerged in 
fair trade.  First, faced with attempts to compromise the standards, some social movement groups 
have organized politically to reverse or halt the weakening, to “defend” the integrity of the 
standards from within the initiative—that is, while remaining inside (or supportive of) the formal 
certification system.  Second, depending on the degree of cooptation, some other groups and 
constituencies have chosen to “opt out,” to leave the formal certification system entirely and 
focus their energy instead on building independent or outside alternatives.   Finally, a third mode 
of resistance is also evident: some actors have engaged in both types of strategies (either 
simultaneously or sequentially), employing an “inside-outside” approach that raises interesting 
questions about the complementary and/or antagonistic roles of different participants within the 
same movement. 
 Inside Responses 
 
 There has been concerted resistance by some actors within the U.S. fair trade system to the 
corporatization of fair trade and the dilution of standards.  This effort has been led by several 
100-percent fair trade coffee roasters, including the U.S. movement pioneer Equal Exchange, 
which lobbied FLO to stop Nestlé’s inclusion in the certification system in the United Kingdom 
(Equal Exchange 2005), and was joined in its criticism by other NGOs and networks in the U.S.  
These roasters have also aimed to raise consumer awareness of the difference between the 
movement-oriented, 100-percent fair trade companies and the “dabbling” of the new corporate 
entrants.  Interestingly, the Organic Consumers Association (OCA)—a membership-based 
advocacy group focusing primarily on protecting and strengthening organic standards— has also 
entered the fair trade fray, periodically engaging its members in campaigns to push Starbucks to 
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purchase higher levels of fair trade certified coffee, most recently in 2008 (Organic Consumers 
Association 2008). 
 A second current has focused on what Doherty and Tranchell (2007) term “radical 
mainstreaming”: the development of fair trade companies whose products still bear the official 
fair trade seal but are distinguished by alternative business models such as worker or producer 
co-ownership, profit-sharing, or a substantial equity stake by the Southern producer cooperatives, 
creating substantially more added value for their members.  The most prominent such example is 
the UK-based Divine Chocolate Ltd. (formerly Day Chocolate) , which produces Divine 
Chocolate bars and is 50 percent owned by Ghanaian cocoa producer organization Kuapa Kokoo 
(Doherty and Tranchell 2005), and which now has a U.S. subsidiary, Divine Chocolate U.S.A.   
U.S. examples of this approach include fair trade pioneer Equal Exchange, a worker-owned 
cooperative, and the Cooperative Coffees grouping of twenty-three 100-percent fair trade 
roasters.  While neither has yet provided an equity stake in the company to their producer 
suppliers, both have chosen to pay well above fair trade minimum prices and have been the most 
vocal in promoting a vision of “deep fair trade” in the U.S. context.      
 Nonetheless, given the extent of the grievances by social movement players against 
Transfair USA and FLO policies, the absence of any coordinated mobilization within the U.S. 
fair trade movement (and in the North more generally) for changes in fair trade pricing and 
certification practices is noteworthy indeed.  “There is no campaign,” note Holt-Giménez et al., 
“to convert a fixed percentage of any of the major firms’ sales to fair or organic trade … and no 
hard proposal for using Fairtrade as a pathway to transform the coffee industry’s value chain into 
something more equitable” (2007: 13).   This lack of a common agenda for change from within 
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the movement greatly limits any efforts to communicate to consumers the nature of the 
challenges facing fair trade, or to outline potential solutions. 
Outside Responses 
 
  Some of the social movement participants in the U.S. fair trade movement have chosen 
instead to express their frustrations about the certification system by leaving it entirely.  In 2004, 
after working both publicly and behind the scenes to address their complaints with the policies of 
Transfair USA, five small, 100-percent fair trade coffee roasters (all members of the Cooperative 
Coffees network) left the Transfair/FLO certification system entirely.  One of the defectors, Matt 
Earley, co-owner of the Madison, Wisconsin roaster Just Coffee, told the Christian Science 
Monitor that “without people outside the increasingly corporate-friendly Transfair system 
pushing for the original vision of a better model, [the movement] will be watered down into 
nothingness” (Rogers 2004).  The five companies continued to purchase coffee from fair trade 
cooperatives and label it as “fairly traded,” but no longer used the Transfair label or pay 
licensing fees, instead giving the money directly to the producer groups in the form of a higher 
price than that mandated by FLO.6   Some of the roasters have associated instead with the Fair 
Trade Federation (FTF)—a predominantly craft-based NGO—and now affix the FTF label to 
their products, although it does not represent an independent certification.  Just Coffee 
additionally claims that its coffee is certified for compliance with fair trade standards by the 
Midwest Organic Services Association, an organic certifier.  These breakaway roasters also 
communicate their claims of fairness to consumers through brand recognition, transparency, and 
building relations of trust (for example, their contracts with producer cooperatives are posted 
publicly online).   These and other movement-oriented fair trade companies, along with NGO 
and activist allies, have succeeded in sparking a debate within the U.S. fair trade movement over 
 
6 One of these five roasters, Dean’s Beans, rejoined the Transfair system in 2007 (Green LA Girl 2008). 
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the costs of corporatization and cooptation, juxtaposing what they term “Fair Trade Lite” against 
the notion of “Deep Fair Trade,” and disseminating lists of 100 percent fair trade businesses 
(e.g., Global Exchange 2007).  However, one of the five defectors, Dean’s Beans, rejoined the 
Transfair system in 2007.  Owner Dean Cycon said that his reasons for returning included a 
desire to influence Transfair policy from within, and the proliferation of uncertified fair trade 
claims by non-movement oriented firms: “More and more companies are coming up with their 
own version of fair trade … my ability to have a clear message was starting to get lost,” stated 
Cycon (Green LA Girl 2008).    
   Another type of “outside” response on the part of small producer cooperatives, social 
movements and non-governmental groups has been to focus on developing domestic fair trade 
markets and systems within their nations, rather than the traditional South-North exchanges of 
tropical commodities that characterize the FLO system.  These domestic efforts are furthest 
advanced in the global South, particularly in Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa (Jaffee et al. 
2004; Wilkinson and Mascarenhas 2007).   This focus on developing domestic fair trade markets 
is also growing in the U.S. context.  Equal Exchange recently debuted a line of non-certified fair 
trade products from U.S. family farmers (some of whom are cooperativized), including pecans, 
almonds and cranberries.  A set of standards for domestic fair trade has slowly been developed 
by a coalition of social justice NGOs, sustainable agriculture advocates and farmworker groups.7  
This effort, the Agricultural Justice Project, initiated a pilot project in 2008 in the upper Midwest 
region, making labeled “Local Fair Trade” produce from certified farms available to consumers 
at grocery stores and food coops in Minnesota and Wisconsin.  The organizers say they plan 
 
7 The groups in the AJP include Rural Advancement Foundation International–USA (RAFI); Comité de Apoyo a los 
Trabajadores Agrícolas/Farmworker Support Committee; Northeast Organic Farming Association; and Florida 
Organic Growers. 
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eventually to expand the standards system nationwide (Agricultural Justice Project 2007; 
Agricultural Justice Project 2008). 
Inside-Outside Responses 
 
 Rather than a binary “inside” versus “outside” question, the dynamic in some of these 
cases might better be described as an oscillation between instances of corporate cooptation or 
weakening of the standards and rules on one hand, and episodes of movement activism that aim 
either to “hold the line” (defend the standards and halt further weakening) or “push back the 
line” (reverse the weakening and strengthen standards), on the other.   Two examples of this 
dynamic are the contentious and ongoing negotiations within FLO over which products will 
remain closed to plantation production, and the struggles over the level of fair trade minimum 
prices—both of which involve U.S. players in substantial roles.  A third is the domestic 
negotiations that took place between Transfair USA and several fair trade NGOs over guidelines 
for the certifier’s engagement with corporations (Transfair USA 2008g).  Additionally, some 
individual participants in these networks have engaged simultaneously (or sequentially) in both 
inside and outside strategies.  The U.S. coffee roasters that left the FLO/Transfair system have 
continued to dialogue with Transfair USA, urging a series of reforms in exchange for rejoining 
the formal system.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
What conclusions might be drawn from this assessment of the landscape of the fair trade 
movement in the U.S.?   I offer a few general observations.   The phenomenon of cooptation—
manifested as both standards dilution and regulatory capture—has clearly taken place and 
continues to occur in the context of the U.S. fair trade system.  Major changes in any such 
movement are inevitable as growth occurs and the organizers begin to reach beyond the 
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politicized core of “conscious consumers” to a mass consumer audience.  Yet the dilution of 
standards need not be inevitable if the certification body can avoid capture and continue to serve 
an independent regulatory function, holding licensees to firm conditions that are consistent with 
the movement’s foundational principles. 
Attempting to use the market to leverage social change is fraught with difficulty.  When 
an alternative social justice market ceases to be marginal and threatens to affect the bottom line 
of the major firms in an industry, attempts at cooptation are likely.  When mainstream firms 
participate in a regulatory structure such as fair trade licensing and certification—particularly 
when they begin to constitute a substantial proportion of sales (and of certifier income)—that 
body is at risk of regulatory capture, and may experience changes in organizational culture as a 
result that facilitate further cooptation.  In the case of the U.S. movement, and in particular the 
regulator/certifier Transfair USA, each of these processes is evident, and in some cases quite 
advanced, as described above.    
 At the same time, pressure and vigilance by social-movement groups clearly has the 
potential to make a meaningful impact in limiting, mitigating, or even in some cases reversing 
these processes.   Indeed, some of the movement-oriented groups have played just such a role, at 
times succeeding in counterbalancing pressures from the large commercial firms to water down 
standards even further.  There is (and has been) an intriguing range of efforts—from actors 
within and beyond the formal standards system—to protect and/or restore the integrity of the 
standards undergirding fair trade.  Campbell (2001: 362) hopefully observes that “while 
cooptation cannot be avoided, it need not be framed as posing a stark choice between politically 
disengaged purity and politically engaged capitulation.”  Not only can outside and inside 
strategies be complementary; they also potentially could take greater advantage of what social 
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movement scholars term the “radical flank effect,” in which the more “extreme” tactics and 
rhetoric of outside groups in a broad movement can make those of moderate insiders appear 
reasonable, rendering their efforts more effective.  “The presence of more extreme groups,” 
writes Dobson (n.d.: 6), “alters the definition of middle, making former radicals seem merely 
progressive.”  
  There are a number factors that arguably make the U.S. fair trade case distinctive.  First is 
the question of the initiative’s political culture.  While the actors who laid the groundwork for 
fair trade in the United States—Equal Exchange coffee in particular had a large influence—were 
as strongly linked with a radical critique of the injustice of global trade as their counterparts in 
Europe, those actors and perspectives were not successfully incorporated into the “DNA” of the 
national certification body.   Although Transfair USA was initially housed within a progressive 
trade policy NGO, once it became independent in 1999 and certification began in earnest, these 
ties were severed.  The board of directors has not reflected the composition of the U.S. 
movement as a whole, with negligible representation by social justice, trade justice or other civil 
society activist organizations or from 100-percent fair trade firms.  This means, among other 
things, that the certifier has fewer internal watchdogs than many of its counterparts in Europe 
and elsewhere.  The embrace of the corporate sector as part of an aggressive growth strategy 
came first in the U.S. as well, beginning with the 2000 agreement to certify Starbucks.  (The 
U.K. certifier Fairtrade Foundation entered these waters half a decade later when it extended the 
certification to Nestlé.)  This may be due in part to the absence of countervailing voices within 
Transfair, and in part to the strong influence of a single individual—Transfair’s founder and 
CEO—in shaping the organization’s policy direction and its institutional culture.   Moreover, the 
U.S. is the home base of many of the largest transnational agri-food firms, including three of the 
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“Big Four” companies that dominate the global coffee trade.  The U.S. consumer market for fair 
trade is also the most potentially lucrative, with a huge possibility for growth in demand.   
 These peculiarities of the U.S. case have several implications for the international fair trade 
movement as a whole.  In many cases, precedents established in the U.S. have effectively “set 
the pattern” for the entire FLO system.   For example, once Starbucks was allowed to enter the 
certification system with only one percent of its purchases at fair trade terms, the bar was 
effectively lowered not only on a national but on a global level; no major competitor would 
likely accept being bound to a higher standard.   Likewise, although earlier debates within FLO 
had partially opened the door to a greater role for plantation and estate products, Transfair USA’s 
aggressive (and ultimately unsuccessful) pursuit of a deal with Chiquita arguably changed the 
playing field and moved the entire FLO system further toward certification of agribusiness.  To 
the extent that such deals create faits accomplis or “facts on the ground” without opportunity for 
democratic deliberation by all major stakeholder groups, these instances of standards dilution are 
very difficult to reverse.   
   On the other hand, the non-state nature of the fair trade standards also offers intriguing 
possibilities for the future: the potential is arguably greater here for reversing some of the losses 
to standards integrity than in a context where standards are codified into law and subject to an 
even greater degree of regulatory capture.  The most obvious such example is the USDA Organic 
standards, which since their promulgation in 2001 have been altered by Congressional 
intervention on numerous occasions on behalf of specific industries or even single firms. 
 Finally, what lessons might the U.S. experience in fair trade offer to fair trade activists 
and organizations in other consumer nations, as well as to newer social movements focused on 
achieving economic justice and sustainability in the agriculture and food system?  How could 
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they best anticipate and avoid some of the problems that have characterized the U.S. case, and 
how might they (re-)design their governance structures to more effectively guard against 
cooptation, preventing or at least forestalling the dilution of standards and the capture of the 
governance bodies by large-scale players?  One observation relates to the scale of participants in 
the system. The fair trade standards contain no explicit stipulations regarding the scale of 
participants—they are mum on the desirability of large transnational and/or publicly-traded 
commercial firms entering the system, and attach no special conditions to these players. Yet their 
large scale has significant ramifications for smaller and mid-sized companies, particularly those 
selling all or mostly fair trade certified products.   They enjoy economies of scale that allow them 
to undercut competitors on retail price, particularly if they are permitted to participate at minimal 
volumes.  The certification of agribusiness plantations in tea, flowers, and other commodities can 
directly threaten the income of smaller producers of these same crops.  Other initiatives might 
wish to consider addressing explicitly in their standards the desirability of large-scale enterprises, 
the conditions of certification (and decertification) and the responsibilities attached to large 
licensees—perhaps including language obliging them to ratchet up their fair trade volumes to 
specific levels in defined time frames. 
 The U.S. fair trade movement also offers insights into the importance of the structure and 
representativeness of certification entities.  Transfair USA’s history indicates that the initial 
decisions that are made regarding the organizational and governance structure of bodies 
governing market access and certification are crucial.  If the original ideological principles and 
visions of the movement’s founders can be incorporated into the bylaws, board and committee 
structures, lines of authority, and funding mechanisms of these entities, it is at least theoretically 
possible for the organization and movement to manage the challenges associated with growth, 
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while also safeguarding against cooptation.  The way that formal and informal power are 
allocated between different constituencies—including NGOs, grassroots activist groups (e.g., 
students), distinct groups of retailers (both non-profit and for-profit), as well as other sectors—
will to a great extent determine the range of policy possibilities.   To the largest extent possible, 
formal governance power should be reflective of the actual breadth and diversity of the 
movement itself.   Financial structures should be designed with an effort to avoid the potential 
for conflicts of interest—e.g., the increased influence of large-scale firms over certifier budgets.    
A clear-eyed analysis indicates that the U.S. fair trade certification standards—the rules 
of the game—have indeed been rendered more friendly for conventional corporate actors.  
However, it is also apparent that the responses by movement activists (in both their inside and 
outside manifestations) to the dilution of standards and to the capture of the certification body, 
have in many cases kept the standards far stronger than they otherwise would have been.  In this 
sense, the development of fair trade in the U.S. could be read either as a cautionary tale, or as an 
unfolding story of contestation with the ending as yet unwritten.      
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